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Purpose: This paper explores the contribution of the public component of Klockars’ and Kutnjak-Ivkovic’s (2004) organizational 
theory of police integrity to the understanding of police integrity.   
  
Design/methodology/approach: The study employs a modified survey derived from “The Measurement of Police Integrity,” 
instrument developed by Klockars, et al. ( 2000). Participants are constituted by a convenience sample of first year social studies 
students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (n = 186) and 160 South African Police Service non-commissioned officers throughout 
Gauteng Province, Republic of South Africa.   
  
Findings: Overall, the data present a mixed picture of integrity in the SAPS. The current study is certainly suggestive that the SAPS 
faces serious challenges to establishing and sustaining integrity and that based on either absolutist or normative criteria the 
organization falls below desired levels of professional integrity. However, there are also indications that a significant proportion of 
officers will support efforts of the organization to establish and maintain professional standards of integrity.   
  
Practical Implications:  The findings, focused on non-commissioned officers, contributes to a growing body of research across all 
levels of the South African Police Service. In addition, the research compares results from a non-police sample helping to 
contextualize the concept of integrity as it exists within the SAPS. More immediate implications relate to the potential for the 
development of a broad-based integrity plan for the South African Police Service as a whole.   
 
 Originality/value: Previous research employing police only samples has concluded that the South African Police Service is an 
integrity challenged organization. While the present study agrees that the SAPS faces significant integrity challenges, the use of a 
comparative non-policing sample also suggests that the Service is having some success in establishing integrity standards, at least 
in regard to lower level violations of organizational ethical standards.   
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In the Republic of South Africa corruption among South African Police Service (SAPS) 
officials has been a constant and troubling issue since the beginning of democratic 
reforms in the early 1990’s and is among the most negative factors influencing the 
erosion of public trust in the Service (Mattes, 2006).  Based on a review of newspaper 
articles from 1996 and 1997, Sayed and Bruce (1998) concluded that “It seems 
reasonable to assert that the occurrence of reports on so many different types of corrupt 
activities in the South African press in little over a year may indicate that police 
corruption in South Africa is fairly extensive as well as being varied in nature” (p. 11).     
In 2003, the National Victims of Crime Survey conducted by the Institute for Security 
Studies’ found that the South African public perceived the SAPS to be the second most 
corrupt public service department in the Country, trumped only by the Traffic 
Department (van Vuuren, 2004), and in the 2006 Afrobarometer survey it was observed 
that 48% of South Africans respondents believed that all or most of the police officials in 
the SAPS were corrupt compared with 36% in 2002 and 38% in 2004. These levels 
significantly exceeded the perception of corruption existing among South African 
Revenue Service officials, teachers and school administrators, judges and magistrates, 
and health workers, for the same years (Mattes and Graham, 2006). According to Faull 
(2007), these findings imply the existence of a unique political-criminal climate of 
corruption, both in South Africa and in the region. 
     By the mid-2000’s a myriad of police misconduct reports prompted even the National 
Police Commissioner to acknowledge that corruption within the agency was problematic 
as “dockets for criminal court cases go missing” (News24, 2005:online).  By 2009, the 
extent of corruption had reached such level that the Minister of Safety and Security, 
Nathi Mthethwa, stated, "[T]he public perception that the police are corrupt is correct” 
(Mail & Guardian online, 2009). Highlighting these concerns was the criminal trial and 
conviction of former SAPS National Commissioner, Jackie Selebi, on two counts of 
corruption and one of defeating the ends of justice that served to reinforce the public 
perception of corruption at all levels of the SAPS. 
     Underlying the issues identified throughout this discussion is the question of the 
organizational integrity of the SAPS.  In 2008, Helen Zille, leader of the Democratic 
Alliance party, alleging that there was a "rising tide" of corruption in the SA Police 
Service also noted that there remained a great many police officers across the country that 
had remained steadfastly committed to the battle against crime. "These hard-working 
officers are increasingly undermined by the culture of graft and self-interest which is 
causing the public to lose faith in the force" (News 24.com, 2008-01-18). 
     To further explore characteristics of the organizational integrity of the South African 
Police Service, and its implications for developing organizational policy, this paper 
compares attitudes of a sample of non-commissioned officers in the SAPS with a 
convenience sample of criminology students enrolled in a South African national 
university on measures of organizational integrity developed by Klockars, Ivkovic, 
Harver, and Haberfeld (2000). The purpose is to explore the extent to which indicators of 
integrity/lack of integrity are uniquely associated with the SAPS as opposed to being 
situated in a larger cultural orientation toward the acceptance/rejection of attitudes 
supporting organizational corruption.    
 
Literature   
    The concept of integrity has been defined/described in several ways.  In the Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary (2009) integrity is defined as a “firm adherence to a code of 
especially moral…values” and as synonymous with incorruptibility. Klockars, Ivkovic 
and Haberfield (2006), specifically relating to police integrity, define it as “the normative 
inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their 
occupation (p. 1).”  Delattre (1996), describes it as the “settled disposition, the resolve 
and determination, the established habit ‘of doing right where there is no one to make you 
do it but yourself’” (p. 325) and goes on to say that  “Achieving the habit and disposition 
of behaving rightly depends on being able to control our own natural passions, being 
willing to deny ourselves things we may powerfully desire, being prepared to make 
sacrifices we have strong inclinations not to make” (pp. 325-326).  He goes on further to 
state that, “without such habits of control, we may yield to the temptation to … behave  
dishonestly when doing so promises pleasure or profit; to behave cravenly when acting 
with moral or physical courage may risk pain or loss or death; … to abuse power and 
authority to gratify our impulses” (p. 326).  For Delattre, the only thing that is 
incorruptible is personal character that refuses to be corrupted.   
 
Corruption and integrity 
    Hypotheses explaining police corruption have fallen into three main positions: the 
society-at-large hypothesis; the structural or affiliation hypothesis; and, the rotten-apple 
hypothesis (Delattre, 1996).  Pollock (2007) describes these positions as systemic (or 
societal explanations), institutional (or organizational) explanations, and individual 
explanations.  The most common has been the rotten-apple, or individual, hypothesis thus 
linking the concept of integrity to the concept of corruption, although when values are 
widely shared and institutionalized within a policing agency we can consider integrity at 
the organizational level, thus the characterization of the SAPS as an integrity-challenged 
agency by Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic (2008).  
     Adlam (1982) argues that the concepts of deviance and corruption are intertwined 
with the concept of integrity in such a way that deviance by officials that lack 
professional integrity in various instances leads almost invariably to corrupt activities.  
His is a static view of corruption in that although events, experiences, and social 
situations change, an individual’s basic personality stays the same.  According to this 
perspective, behavior is structured by pre-existing personality traits that are fixed early in 
life and remain intact.  In contrast, Walker (2008) argues that police officials, with 
limited exceptions, “are honest at the outset of their careers (p. 460),” and thus the rotten-
apple explanation is inadequate.  Consistent with this view, Delattre (1996) describes a 
process that helps to explain the transformation from a basically honest to a corrupt 
police officer:  
 
          “(1) If a young person of high ideals but little exposure to realities that challenge  
          naïve expectations of human decency (2) enters a world that exposes the worst in  
          people and (3) is trained and influenced by senior colleagues who have lost faith in  
          police work, and (4) if the young colleagues who use their work to line their own  
          pockets and (5) if their superiors are unlikely to support efforts to behave  
          honorably, and (6) and likelihood of sanction for corruption is negligible, (7) then   
          the young person will probably accept the status quo and join in corrupt practices,  
          perhaps with initial feelings of shame, but ultimately without remorse” (p. 76 ). 
 
    Closely linked to the institutional/organizational model of corruption is Klockars’ and 
Kutnjak-Ivkovic’s (2004) organizational theory of police integrity based on the early 
work of Herman Goldstein (1975, 1977).  Their model is developed along four 
organizational and occupational dimensions: (1) organizational rules; (2) prevention and 
control mechanisms; (3) the Code; and, (4) public expectations.  As the characteristics of 
organizations within each of these dimensions vary so to does the likelihood and extent of 
corruption vary between organizations.  The first dimension, organizational rules, is 
concerned with the how rules governing corruption are established, communicated, and 
understood.  The second dimension (prevention and control mechanisms) addresses the 
various techniques, mechanisms, in place within an organization, to prevent and control 
corruption.  The third dimension, the Code, addresses the extent to which a “Code of 
Silence” operates within the organization that informally prohibits or discourages officers 
from reporting the misconduct of others.  And finally, public expectations addresses the 
influence of a department’s external social, economic, and/or political , environment as 
it/they affect the acceptance/rejection of corruption by a community.  To test the efficacy 
of their model, Klockars, Kutnjak-Ivkovic and Haberfield (2004) developed a survey 
instrument to measure the extent of integrity among police officials. While the first three 
dimensions of the model have been researched to a great extent, the fourth dimension has 
not. We seek to fill part of this gap by comparing a non-policing sample with a police 
sample. 
    In light of the background of corruption within the SAPS, questionnaires containing 
hypothetical cases of police corruption were collected from 379 police supervisors drawn 
from seven provinces within South Africa during 2005 (Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic, 
2008).  Based on the results they concluded that the SAPS was an integrity-challenged 
organization and suggested that post-apartheid supervisory appointees were more inclined 
towards acts of questionable integrity in their daily functions as police officials than their 
predecessor appointees. 
       Ultimately, interpretation of the degree of integrity in an organization is evaluated by 
comparing the values and actions of its members against a set of standards defining what 
is and is not proper behavior for the institution.  Kappeler et al. (1998) identify four 
paradigms by which such evaluations have been conducted: statistical definitions; 
absolutist definitions; reactivist definitions; and, normative definitions. Among these, the 
reactivist and normative paradigms have the greatest relevance for our study.  For 
example, the normative paradigm is exemplified in the correspondence of the scenarios 
with prohibitions established by the South African Police Service Discipline Regulations 
of 2005, Regulation 20 (Sauerman and Ivkovic, 2008) and, with the exception of scenario 
#1, with the International Chiefs of Police Standards of Conduct (Raines, 2010).  From 
this perspective the prohibitions are the product of the organizational rule-making process 
formalizing organizational norms. From the perspective of the reactivist paradigm, 
member lack of support for the consequences of rule violations (discipline) also indicates 
an absence of support for the rules themselves about which the consequences, reaction, 
are administered. A reactive definition also implies the relativity of individual harms, i.e. 
that some acts are more harmful than others and thus deserving of more severe sanctions. 
A reactivist interpretation also intersects with the normative perspective in the context of 
the “code of silence” where the informal norm of not reporting violations by fellow 
officers inhibits the ability of the organization to properly establish discipline within the 
organization. Thus, these paradigms will be central to our later interpretation of results 
and the implications of our findings for organizational policy. 
   
Methods 
    According to Kappeler, Sluder and Alpert (1998), “Defining what is deviant is akin to 
defining other socially unacceptable behavior.  That is, the task of reaching a definition is 
often vexing and bewildering to those attempting to articulate what is, as opposed to what 
is not, deviant” (p. 11). An example of the definitional problem is Barker and Carter’s 
(1986) observation that, “Police deviance is a generic description of police officer 
activities which are inconsistent with the officers’ legal authority, organizational 
authority, and standards of ethical conduct. It can encompass a plethora of behaviors for 
which an officer can be disciplined (pp. 1-2).” 
    In addition to the problem of definition is the problem of measuring corruption once a 
definition has been accepted.  According to Sherman (2008:454), measuring the level of 
corruption is an extremely difficult task, primarily because it is such a covert crime – it 
stands to reason that in most corruption cases the perpetrator is also committing a crime.  
Klockars, et al. (2000) expand on the problem this can have for policy makers. They 
state: “Corruption is extremely difficult to study in a direct, quantitative, and empirical            
manner. Because most incidents of corruption are never reported or recorded, official 
data on corruption are best regarded as measures of a police agency's anti-corruption 
activity, not the actual level of corruption” (Klockars, et al., 2000, p. 2). 
    A third problem in conducting research into police corruption arises from the fact that 
“[e]ven with assurances of confidentiality, police officers are unlikely to be willing to 
report their own or another officer’s corrupt activities” (Klockars et al., 2000, pp. 2-3).  
To address these issues, Klockars et al. (2004), as noted above, developed a survey 
instrument to measure the extent of integrity among police officials.  Prior to our study 
the questionnaire had proven successful as a measure of police integrity in over a dozen 
countries ranging from the United States, England, and Canada, to Japan,  Pakistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.  It has also been used 
to measure integrity in the SAPS in three previous studies (see, Newham, 2003; 




The research instrument 
    The instrument employs questions of fact and opinion that can be explored directly, 
without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behavior are likely to 
provoke (Klockars et al., 2000, p. 3).  The survey consists of eleven scenarios (Table 1) 
depicting behaviors that may constitute criminal conduct, violations of official police 
policy, or general professional standards.  Support for this assertion is based on Sauerman  
and Kutnjak-Ivkovic (2008) who, in their study of integrity among supervisors in the 
South African Police Service, identified each scenario as describing a violation of one or 
more definitions of “misconduct” included in the South African Police Service Discipline 
Regulations of 2005, Regulation 20.  In addition, Raines (2010) in her analysis of the 
Klockars et al. data observed that ten (excludes case #1) of the eleven scenarios could be 
correlated with the International Chiefs of Police Standards of Conduct.   
    In the Klockars, et al. (2000) survey seven questions, corresponding to the 
organizational/occupational dimensions discussed above, were asked for each scenario.  
One question evaluates the respondent’s knowledge regarding the existence of 
regulations (organizational rules).  A second set asks respondents to indicate how serious 
such violations would be considered by themselves and by other officers (prevention and 
control). A third set asks respondents to indicate the likelihood that they would report an 
observed violation (the Code) as well as the likelihood that other officers would report 
such an infraction (the Code).  Finally respondents were asked what discipline they 
thought should follow from such an infraction (prevention and control mechanisms) as 
well as what discipline they thought would most likely follow (prevention and control 
mechanisms). The fourth dimension, public expectations, however, is not measured by 
the survey.  As a measure of this dimension we employ a sample of South African 
students enrolled in a first year criminology course at one of the national universities. 
Because we cannot expect the student sample to be aware of organizational specifics we 
have modified the original survey (Table 2), by limiting the number of questions asked in 
the original survey. While we use the same scenarios described in Table 1 we do not ask 
questions regarding specific awareness of the SAPS regulations nor what discipline 
would most likely occur within the organization for the specific violations described in 
the scenarios,  In addition, we also omit those questions which ask respondents to 
indicate, in the case of our student sample, how serious they believe the police in general 
would perceive the act, and in the case of police respondents, how serious they believe 
other police would rate the acts.   We also omit the question regarding perceptions of 
whether the police would be likely to report a violation, in the case of the student sample, 
or the likelihood that other police officials would report a violation for our police sample.  
Although important, responses to these questions would likely provide only uninformed 
estimates of what our student sample thinks others believe or would do rather than 
estimations based on personal observation or experience. They can, however, provide 
their perspectives on the seriousness of an act and whether they believe they would report 
an observed violation if they were a police official. 
 
The samples 
    To gauge public expectations the survey was provided to a convenience sample of first 
year social studies students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal comprising all race 
groups, namely African, Indian, white and colored, and made up of both males and  
TABLE 1 
Case Scenarios (Klockars, et al. ( 2000)), “ The Measurement of Police Integrity,”  Research in 
Brief, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice 
 
Scenario 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs 
security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc.  He does this work during his off-duty hours.  
 
Scenario 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small 
value from merchants on his beat.  He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the 
generosity of those who give gifts to him. 
 
Scenario 3,* A police officer stops a motorist for not obeying a red traffic light.  The officer 
agrees to accept a personal gift for half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a 
citation. 
* Modified to fit SA experience (Kutnjak Ivkovic and Sauerman, 2007) 
 
Scenario 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local 
merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him 
gifts of food and liquor. 
 
Scenario 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop.  The display cases are 
smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken.  While searching the shop, he takes a 
watch, worth about two days pay for that officer.  He reports that the watch had been stolen 
during the burglary. 
 
Scenario 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer 
the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop.  In exchange for each referral, he 
receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner. 
 
Scenario 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to 
work during the coming holidays.  A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to 
tune-up his supervisor's personal car.  Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior. 
 
Scenario 8. At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted 
road.  He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch.  He approaches 
the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated.  He also finds that 
the driver is a police officer.  Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the 
driver to his home. 
 
Scenario 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour 
past its legal closing time.  Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a 
couple of free drinks from the owner. 
 
Scenario 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into 
an automobile.  The man flees.  They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by 
tackling him and wrestling him to the ground.  After he is under control both officers punch him a 
couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. 
 
Scenario 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot.  It contains the amount of money 
equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer.  He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the 







a. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be? 
 
  Not at all                    Undecided                                       Very  
    serious                    serious        
       




 b. If a police official engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any, 
discipline do YOU think SHOULD be followed? 
 
 
1.  NONE             2.  VERBAL REPRIMAND  
 
 3.  WRITTEN REPRIMAND                4.  PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY  
 
5.  DEMOTION IN RANK            6.  DISMISSAL 
 
 
 c. If you were a police official, do you think YOU would report a fellow police official who 
               engaged in this behavior? 
 
Definitely         Undecided               Definitely  
     not                         yes 
       






females in the Spring of 2009.  All students in the first-year criminology class were 
invited to participate in the survey. Although we are seeking insight into public 
perceptions of the seriousness of the acts, the appropriate response to violations, and self-
reported likelihood that they would report a violation, for several reasons our sample 
cannot be considered  representative of the general population. The consequence thus 
poses limitations regarding implications of our findings for the development of policy.   
However, the student sample does provide a contrast to the police sample and thus 
broadens the framework for understanding characteristics of attitudes among the police 
sample related to organizational integrity. 
     Out of a class size of 288 students, 186 agreed to participate. Those who agreed 
remained in the lecture hall following the formal lecture. The survey was administered by 
one of the principal investigators who also attended to queries from students regarding 
the survey.  Due to time limitations, participants only had 45 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire resulting in some loss of data regarding scenarios 9, 10, and 11, as some 
participants were unable to complete the entire survey in the allotted time. One-hundred-
fifty-nine (85%) of the original 186 participants completed the entire survey while 169 
(90.8%) completed ten of the eleven scenarios and 173 (93%) completed nine of the 
scenarios. While this loss of data is undesirable we have no reason to believe that there 
was systematic bias in the characteristics of those who did complete the entire survey 
versus those who were unable to do so.   And while the sample is not statistically 
representative of the larger population, we do believe it does approximate important 
dimensions of attitudes regarding the respondents’ own values and their perceptions of 
integrity among the South African police. 
    The police sample was from previous research on integrity conducted in 2008 among 
160 SAPS non-commissioned officers in Gauteng Province (Meyer and Reyneke-Tarbitt, 
2009).  Fifty- one (31.9%) of the police officials held the rank of constable, 28 (17.5%) 
were sergeants, and 78 (48%) held the rank in Inspector.  Years of service ranged from 
less than one year (6.2%) to more than 20 years (19.4%) with almost 70% having been in 
the SAPS for six or more years and over half (55.6%) having been in the SAPS for ten or 
more years.  One-third of the sample was currently assigned to a very large station (over 
500 officers) while 5.6% were serving in very small (<25) stations in rural areas of the 
Province.   Finally, almost 40% were currently assigned to Patrol while another 20% 
were in detective/investigative assignments with an additional 20% serving in 
administrative positions.  Overall, three-fourths of the officers in the sample were in non-
supervisory positions.  This original sample was purposively obtained to expand on the 
work of Sauerman and Kutnjak-Ivkovic (2008) whose earlier investigation of integrity in 
the SAPS was specifically directed toward those holding supervisory, mid-management, 
ranks. 
    
Findings and Discussion 
 
Perceived seriousness of depicted acts 
    The first question we address is the perceptions of our samples regarding the 
seriousness of the acts depicted in our scenarios.  One observation (Table 3) that we make 
is that there is a general consistency in the relative rankings of the seriousness of the acts 
between our student and police samples which is strongly suggestive of a hierarchical 
ordering of moral evaluations. It is clear that some acts have a higher negative evaluation 
in regard to moral respectability.  However, we also observe several differences between 
the two groups when we look at the specific evaluation of an act as a serious or very 
serious violation.  
    For three of the scenarios, theft from a crime scene, accepting a traffic bribe, and 
covering a DUI involving another police official the police rate the acts as less serious 
than our student sample.  This is an important disparity as the acts depicted are generally 
considered more serious violations of an officer’s integrity.  In contrast, however, in four 
of the scenarios the police rate the acts depicted as more serious than our student sample. 
For two of these instances, acceptance of a gift and the running an off-duty security alarm 
business, the rationale for the prohibition of such acts may have been lost on a non-police 
sample as such acts may appear quite innocuous and unrelated to larger concerns for graft 
and corruption among the police. On the level of the comparative seriousness of 
violations such acts may appear quite benign.   
     The student sample also indicates a substantially greater acceptance of the improper 
use of force on a suspect compared with our police sample. This may be indicative of the 
relatively high frustration with crime and a low tolerance of criminals among the general 
South African population. Over the past several years there have been a number of high 
profile incidents where community members have seriously assaulted suspects and in a 
couple of incidents community members were responsible for deaths of suspects. In such 
a context it should not be surprising that citizens would be supportive of extralegal force 
by police officers. The fourth scenario where the police viewed the act as more serious 
than the student-sample was in the case of a kick-back for a referral of a citizen to a body 
shop for car repairs following an accident. 
 
.   
Table 3  
Comparisons of Student and Police Assessments 
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    For the remaining four scenarios there was little difference in the perceptions of 
seriousness although it is interesting that the police considered the abuse of position by a 
supervisor somewhat more seriously than did the students and as more serious than a 
kick-back or covering up a DUI accident involving another police official as well as 
being as serious as assaulting a suspect, and only somewhat less serious than the keeping 
of found property.  Clearly an abuse of a supervisor’s position in which the police official 
may see him/herself as the victim is considered fairly serious as opposed to the 
subversion of justice.   However, except for the very most serious of the scenarios, 
overall the police rated the depicted acts as more serious than our student sample. 
Whether they truly felt that the acceptance of food or liquor as gifts or the acceptance of 
gratuities were improper it is reasonably clear that, as a whole, given the percentages of 
officers identifying these acts a serious or very serious, the police responses do evidence 
an awareness of the contributory potential (a slippery slope) of such acts for corruption.  
In contrast, however, is the fact that a non-trivial minority of each group did not appraise  
theft from a crime scene, the acceptance of a monetary traffic bribe, or the acceptance of 
free drinks as a bribe as constituting serious violations. Clearly, in the case of the last, 
this creates a serious challenge for the South African Police Service. 
  
Sanctions and violations 
    As discussed previously, perceptions of the appropriateness of sanctions in the 
evaluation of police integrity is, in part, an evaluation of the role of accountability for 
improper/inappropriate use of ones official position. As a matter of moral calculus one is 
not expected to be able to say on the one hand that an act is morally wrong but on the 
other hand that one should not be held accountable for the act. However, the 
appropriateness/fairness of a sanction is also judged by its proportionality to the 
perceived seriousness of the violation of a proscribed rule or regulation as well as its 
relationship to the goals of accountability. In contemporary police management 
accountability is viewed more in the context of discipline as opposed to sanctions where   
discipline is understood to have both positive and negative dimensions where “positive” 
discipline is seen as an attempt to change employee behavior without invoking 
punishment (Glensor, Peak, and Gaines, 1999) and negative discipline (punishment) 
invoking a punitive response when positive discipline fails or a violation is of a nature 
that punishment is required in order to maintain the overall integrity of the organization. 
The need for proportionality in discipline is reflected in Glensor et al.’s (1999) 
observation that: 
      “Management must be very careful when recommending and imposing 
      discipline because of its impact on the overall morale of the agency’s  
      employees.  If employees perceive the recommended discipline as too 
      lenient, a supervisor may be sending the wrong message: The misconduct 
      is insignificant. On the other hand, discipline that is viewed as too harsh 
      may have a demoralizing effect on the officer(s) and other agency employees  
      involved and result in allegations that the leadership is unfair,” (p. 213). 
 
     These principles appear to be reflected in the responses of both of our samples (Table 
4) although the student sample appears substantially more inclined to support more 
severe sanctions for the most serious violations whereas the police tend to support  
intermediate sanctions for these violations.  For example, in the case of a theft of property 
from a crime scene 89.8% of the student respondents indicated support for one of the 
three more severe sanctions (suspension, demotion or dismissal) compared with 66.2% of 
the police respondents.  In the case of a traffic bribe the difference is starker.  Almost 
80% of the student respondents supported suspension, demotion or dismissal for such a 
violation compared to 56.2% of the police officials.  However, both of these offenses are 
considered among the three most serious by both groups, the other being the acceptance 
of free bar drinks for allowing a bar to stay open after hours. In the case of the bar we  
 
Table 4 
Comparisons of the Perceived Level of Appropriate Sanctions 
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again observe a substantial difference in the level of sanction recommended with 55% of 
the students supporting one of the three more severe sanctions compared to 36.2% of 
police respondents.   
    At the other end of the spectrum fully 8-12% of police respondents recommend no 
sanctions even for the most serious instances of corruption or dishonesty depicted.  These 
include the scenarios regarding theft from a crime scene, accepting a traffic bribe, theft of  
found property, acceptance of a kickback, acceptance of free drinks in payment for 
allowing a bar to stay open after hours, and covering up a DUI involving another police     
official. Among these violations only in the cases of a body-shop kickback and covering 
up a DUI is the no sanction option more frequent for the student respondents, and in the 
case of the cover-up the response rates are actually about the same for the two groups. In 
the other four instances the no sanction option was selected by student respondents for 
only two to four percent of the cases.   
    On the lower end of the seriousness scale we also see stark differences in the 
recommended sanctions between the student and police samples.  Only 17.8% of the 
student respondents indicated that the acceptance of a holiday gift, and 14.5% that 
running an off-duty alarm business, were serious or very serious violations. This 
compares to 48.8% and 47.5% of police respondents, respectively, rating these acts as 
serious or very serious violations. These differences are very much reflected in the level 
of sanction deemed appropriate for these acts.  In the case of student respondents, 62.4% 
selected the no sanction option for both scenarios compared to 26.9% of police for 
accepting holiday gifts and 29.4% for running an off-duty alarm business.  
     Overall, when we compare Tables 3 and 4 we observe the expected relationship 
between the perceived seriousness of the act and the level of discipline supported. 
Harsher responses are reserved, by both the student and police samples, for those 
scenarios ranked more serious. Having said as much, however, we also observed a 
general reluctance on the part of the police to impose the harshest sanctions.  Only for 
theft from a crime scene and acceptance of a traffic bribe is dismissal from the SAPS the 
most frequent response.  The student respondents also have an overall stronger punitive 
stance regarding the more seriously ranked violations.  For example, in the case of the 
theft from a crime scene student respondent’s recommended one of the three harsher 
sanctions 89.8 percent of the time compared with police respondents recommending these 
sanctions 66.2 percent of the time.  In the case of acceptance of a traffic bribe the 
differences were 77.5 percent for student respondents compared to 57.2 percent for police 
respondents.   
      Among the less seriously ranked scenarios, with the exception of free/discounted 
meals the police took a stronger stance on sanctions.  Whereas almost two-thirds of 
student respondents indicated that no sanction was the most appropriate response to 
accepting a holiday gift or running an off-duty business approximately one-half of the 
officers indicated an oral or written reprimand was in order for such violations. In the 
case of free/discounted meals there was greater agreement between the two groups 
although the police were slightly more likely to recommend less serious sanctions. 
     One of the more interesting observations regarding sanctions is in the context of a 
possible demotion in the case of a supervisor giving a day off to a subordinate for tuning-
up the supervisor’s car.  This is the only scenario for which more than ten percent of the 
police respondents felt that demotion was the appropriate sanction and appears directly 
related to the misuse of the supervisor’s positional authority.  Regardless of the benefit 
derived by the lower ranking official the police apparently do not define the situation as 
involving a real choice by the subordinate.  It is also interesting that two-thirds of the 
police respondents indicated (see Table 5) they would report such a violation, the third 
highest likelihood among all the scenarios. 
 
Willingness to report: the “code” 
     A general reluctance or unwillingness of organizational members to report violations 
of expected standards of conduct poses significant challenges for an organization in its 
effort to institute and maintain organizational integrity.  Such reluctance is indicated for 
both the police and student samples (see Table 5).  Numerous researchers have concluded 
that among the distinguishing characteristics of the police occupational culture are the 
values of solidarity and secrecy that function to protect the organization from outside 
 
Table 5 
Comparison of Student and Police Officer Assessments of their  
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Percentage of respondents indicating they would or definitely would report a violation of scenario 
           
2
 Rank order willingness to report a violation of depicted scenario. 
 
scrutiny of deviant practices (Crank, 2004; Kleinig, 1996; Skolnick, 2000).   
While the existence of a code of silence is generally taken for granted, Barker (2002) 
reports that some recent research indicates the code may be declining in force and more 
recently, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) concluded, based on a study of Georgia (USA) 
police officers, that the police are “slightly less likely to subscribe to a code of silence 
than civilian public employees” (p. 627). Rothwell and Baldwin’s argument is not that a 
code of silence does not exist in police organizations but rather that such a code is not 
uniquely characteristic of a police culture, although they also assert that whistle-blowing 
may actually be more common in police agencies than in civilian agencies. Our findings 
provide some support for their perspective.   
     Overall our results are mixed, with the police sample indicating somewhat greater 
stated willingness to report violations compared to our student sample.  In no case, 
however, do more than three-fourths of the police respondents indicate they would report 
an observed violation of any incident whereas four-fifths of the student respondents said 
they would report a theft from a crime scene and slightly more than three-fourths said 
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they would report an observed traffic bribe.  In contrast, slightly more than one-third of 
student respondents indicated that they would report the acceptance of free drinks to 
allow a bar to stay open past its legally required closing time whereas seventy percent of 
the police officials indicated they would report such an incident.   
      As is the case with sanctions, both groups indicate a greater likelihood of reporting a 
violation they view as being more serious.  However, the proportion of respondents 
indicating that they would report violations is consistently less than the proportion of 
those indicating an act as either a serious or very serious violation. Thus, even in the 
cases viewed to be the most serious there is a strong evidence of a reticence to inform on 
others. The police respondents indicate somewhat less willingness to report the more 
serious violations depicted compared with student respondents but substantially more 
willing to report the less serious violations.  This may be suggestive of two counter-
forces working within the SAPS, formal organizational rules and the informal police 
culture.  To the extent that the student respondents are representative of the larger society 
their reluctance to report violations may be suggestive of a larger cultural value against 
“whistle-blowing” in which the police sub-cultural value of protecting their own operates.  
From the data it appears that the SAPS may be having some success in limiting lower 
level potentially corruptive influences such as the acceptance of gratuities or the 
receiving of gifts but on more serious levels of corruption the data is suggestive that the 
informal code not to inform on fellow officers may be acting as an inhibitor to limiting 
corruption.   
     A caveat to the above discussion, however, is that one must be cautious in drawing too 
strong an inference. That police respondents indicate that they would report a violation 
may be indicative of a tendency to provide the “correct” response to the question rather 
than an actual likelihood of reporting.  On the other hand, the lower rate at which the 
police indicate a willingness to report violations such as theft from a crime scene, theft of 
found property, acceptance of a traffic bribe or acceptance of a bar bribe lends credibility 
to their reported willingness to report lower level violations when compared to our 
student respondents.              
 
Conclusions 
     Our purpose in this paper has been to explore the potential contribution of the public 
component of Klockars’ and Kutnjak-Ivkovic’s (2004) organizational theory of police 
integrity to the understanding of police integrity by the use of comparison between a 
sample of non-commissioned officers in the South African Police Service and a non-
police sample of students enrolled in a criminology program at a South African 
university.  It should also be clear that the public component does not establish the 
criteria for evaluating organizational integrity, the police may certainly be held to a 
higher standard.  As stated by Delattre (1996, p. 68), “Those who serve the public must 
hold to a higher standard of honesty and care for the public good than the general 
citizenry does.”   
     Overall, the data present a mixed picture of integrity in the SAPS.  On one hand, a 
non-trivial number of our police respondents, around twenty percent, indicate that even 
acts such as theft and bribery were not serious violations.  In addition, the police 
respondents are at odds with our student respondents who by a very high degree define 
such acts as serious or very serious violations.  In contrast, the police sample was much 
more likely to assess such acts as accepting gifts and gratuities as well as operating an off 
duty business as more serious than our student respondents.  Thus while there should be 
concern regarding police attitudes toward serious violations of integrity the greater 
support among the police respondents for prohibitions restricting less serious acts may 
indicate that the SAPS is having some success through policy, training, and supervision, 
in gaining support for anti-corruption efforts. And while the police, overall, are quite 
reluctant to support dismissal from the service, even for serious violations, they do 
support greater levels of discipline for less serious violations compared with our student 
sample.    
      It is also interesting that in eight of the scenarios the self-reported willingness of the 
police to report violations is higher in the police sample compared with the student 
sample.  This is consistent with Barker’s (2002) observation that some recent research 
indicates the code may be declining in force as well as Rothwell and Baldwin’s (2007) 
conclusion that the police are “slightly less likely to subscribe to a code of silence than 
civilian public employees” (p. 627).  Caution should be taken, however, in that their 
findings are based on American police samples.  It should also be noted that in an earlier 
study by Meyer and Reyneke-Tarbitt (2009), South African police respondents were 
observed to be much more likely to state that they would personally report violations 
compared with their assessment of the likelihood that other police officials would report 
such violations. This suggests that a self-reported willingness to break the “code” will not 
necessarily translate into the actual reporting of violations as our data indicates that the 
“code” is active in the SAPS. 
      Due to the mixed findings in the present study it appears that Sauerman and Kutnjak-
Ivkovic’s (2008) characterization of the SAPS as an integrity-challenged agency may 
have painted with too broad a brush. The current study is certainly suggestive that the 
SAPS faces serious challenges to establishing and sustaining integrity and that based on 
either absolutist or normative criteria the organization falls below desired levels of 
professional integrity.  However, there are also indications that a significant proportion of 
officers will support efforts of the organization to establish and maintain professional 
standards of integrity.   
 
Implications 
     Among others, two major implications derive from our findings.  First, even though 
our use of a sample representing the community dimension of Klockars and Kutnjak-
Ivkovic’s organizational theory of integrity has provided a small window into the greater 
complexity of police integrity than is revealed by a police sample alone, limitations of 
generalizing the results from the student sample to the larger society is strongly 
suggestive of the need for broader evaluations of societal attitudes regarding the 
acceptability of police behaviors as depicted in the scenarios. The second implication is 
the significance of the findings for policy development and promulgation in the SAPS, 
especially as regards the “code.”  In their research on integrity among non-commissioned 
officers in the SAPS, Meyer and Reyeneke-Tarbit (2009) noted the interrelationships 
among the several dimensions of the Klockars’, et al. (2000) survey where the stated 
willingness to report a violation was directly related to perceived seriousness of the acts 
as well as the perceived appropriateness of discipline for violations. It is clear from the 
present findings that individuals recruited into the SAPS will arrive with already 
established views regarding what are proper and improper behaviors as well as a sense of 
the relative seriousness those viewed as improper.  That these perspectives may conflict 
with organizational standards is also indicated.  In addition, our results strongly suggest 
that general attitudes supportive of the “code” are already present in our student sample 
indicating the need to address a culture of integrity early and continuously in recruit 
training.  Overall, our results indicate the value of a comparative non-policing sample in 
assessing the overall integrity of a police organization and challenges in developing and 
implementing an effective organizational integrity plan.     
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